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ONE THOUSAND YEARS AT THE
CROSSROADS OF HISTORY:
History and the Politics of Transition
Géza Jeszenszky
I. The Sick Heart of Europe
Twenty-one years ago the distinguished British historian Hugh
Seton-Watson delivered a series of lectures at the University of
Washington–Seattle. In his opening statement, he said, “Europe
remains the heart of the human race, and the heart of Europe is
sick.” Central Europe—the lands and peoples between Western
Europe and the Russians—has been rather unwell at least since
the First World War. Some would say the sickness goes back to
the destruction of the Kingdom of Hungary in the sixteenth cen-
tury by the Ottoman Turks and the troubles that began in the
eastern borderland area of Poland soon thereafter. The theme of
this essay is the cause and the nature of this sickness, and how
this European heartland has played such a uniquely important
role in the history of the world.
Today, we can safely say that with the sudden collapse of the
communist utopia in 1989 and the failed coup attempt in
Moscow in 1991, the post-Second World War period came to an
end, and a new era in world history began. Thus, this century’s
third historic turning point came in 1989–91 (the first two being
1918 – 20 and 1945 – 47), and, as with the previous ones, the bor-
derland between Western Europe and the Russian heartland
found itself the scene of the most decisive events.
Annus mirabilis, 1989, still echos in our minds. With the end of
the Cold War and the accompanying danger of a nuclear holo-
caust, 1989 was a watershed year. The Iron Curtain and the
Berlin Wall collapsed, and democracy was introduced to the
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central heartland of the European continent. It was the end of
the twentieth century, the century of the great disappointment.
Contrary to Francis Fukuyama’s prediction, however, it did not
turn out to be the end of history, but rather the end of brutal,
open dictatorship and terror in the former communist countries.
It was the end of the term “East Europe” — which the inhabi-
tants of the Soviet dependencies always thoroughly disliked
because it was the equivalent of Communist Europe — the end
of the Age of Newspeak, and the end of the Age of Lies. Nothing
that has happened since 1989, and nothing that the future might
bring, will ever take away from those who lived and partici-
pated in the memory of that glorious year. It was a time of great
hope, a moment of bliss.
II. From East Europe to Europe
Since the term “Europe” was born in ancient Greece, there was
only one Europe; however, its borders, especially on the east,
were not clear. In the Roman Empire, the border of the province
of Pannonia was the Danube, from Bratislava to Belgrade.
Charlemagne’s power extended approximately to the present
Austria-Hungary border. Two hundred years later, Poland,
Bohemia, Hungary, and Croatia emerged as independent Chris-
tian kingdoms with chancelleries, priests, politicians, and poets
using Latin and with Gothic churches and cathedrals being con-
structed throughout countries. What is today Central Europe
was an integral part of the Occident (the West) in a political,
legal, and cultural sense.
The Ottoman Conquest of Hungary in the fourteenth century
brought the Orient (the East) to the gates of Vienna, but after
falling prey to the most successful Crusade launched by Christ-
ian armies, the Ottomans were expelled from Hungary by the
beginning of the eighteenth century. A revival of economy and
culture followed, with Western political thought penetrating the
Polish and Hungarian nobility, gentry, and the growing middle
class. Before World War I, the frontiers of Europe reached towns
such as St. Petersburg, Kiev, Odessa, Sofia, and Athens. At that
time there was no such term as East Europe, and the Balkans
were often referred to as the Near East. During this period, the
notion of a Central Europe appeared in order to distinguish the
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lands of the Hapsburg Monarchy from the Balkans and the
Russian Empire.
With the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy at the
end of World War I and the victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia, a
Europe governed by the rule of law emerged and the market
economy picked up by the late 1920s. The dividing line was with
Soviet Russia, which became the so-called cordon sanitaire
because of the brutal Stalinist social experiment that claimed
millions of lives and violated most of our traditional norms of
civilized human behavior. After the Second World War and the
communist takeovers orchestrated from Moscow, the Eastern
world penetrated deeply into Europe. Warsaw, Prague,
Budapest, Zagreb—all truly European capitals—and their well-
educated inhabitants soon found themselves in a totally differ-
ent world, cut off by an Iron Curtain from those centers and
circles, from Italy to France and England, where their ancestors
studied, made friends, and bought books and goods.
But in 1989, the largely artificial federations — the Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia — ceased to exist,
nations and states emerged from decades of oblivion, and par-
liaments in Kiev and Moscow (not to mention Vilnius, Riga, and
Tallinn) became real centers of debate and power. Even Western
business, fast food, and music found their way into the major
cities of Russia.
How many of the hopes of 1989–91 will be realized? How can
the values of Europe, the traditions of decent behavior, and the
rule of law be established in Central Europe? What about the
price for economic freedom? Already a great disappointment
has set in, leading to the adoption of false gods that may bring
new dangers, new tragedies. Is the brutal and senseless war in
the former Yugoslavia an aberration or a warning of things to
come? The answers require a more thorough analysis of the lat-
est social and political developments in the former communist
countries and of the responses by “the West.” This paper focuses
on Hungary, the center of the heart of Europe, but speaks to the
region as a whole and to the European continent.
Géza Jeszenszky
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III. The Painful Past: The Case of Hungary
The life of every people is influenced by its historical
antecedents. In the case of Hungary and its neighbors, the
effects of historical forces on everyday life were far more appar-
ent than in Western Europe. As an example Hungary is a con-
vincing enough case, but just as telling are the impact of the
partitions in Poland and the centuries of foreign domination
over the Czechs and the Balkan nations.
The Hungarian community, Finno-Ugric in language but
resembling the Turkic peoples in their way of life and political
and military organization, was molded in the Eastern steppe
zone of Europe in the sixth and seventh centuries, arriving at the
end of the ninth century in its present homeland, the fertile
basin surrounded by the defending mountain chains of the
Carpathians. Wedged between the Germanic and Slavonic peo-
ples in an alien environment, the Hungarians were saved only
by a series of wise political decisions from the fate of oblivion
that afflicted far stronger and larger peoples in the age of migra-
tions, such as the Huns, the Avars, the Cumans, and the Petch-
enegs. Between the eleventh and fifteenth centuries, Hungary
(Magyarország, in the native tongue) developed into one of the
most prosperous states in Europe. The secret of this success was
the adoption of Christianity and an active involvement in the
intellectual and political mainstream of Europe. The great Euro-
pean intellectual movements—Humanism, the Renaissance, the
Reformation, the Enlightenment, and Liberalism—all became
formative and integral parts of Hungarian development. On the
other hand, Hungary (like the other Central European king-
doms that adopted the Western version of Christianity)
remained a peripheral area of Europe. Its eastern border was
commonly referred to as “the last bastion of Christendom.”
Involvement in numerous wars against invaders from the East
cemented the relationship between the Hungarians, Poles, and
Czechs on the one hand, and the rest of Europe on the other.
After the Turkish wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies and right up until 1848, Hungary was submerged de
facto, if not de jure, in the Hapsburg Empire.
In 1896, Hungary celebrated the country’s foundation, the one
thousandth anniversary of “the Conquest” of the Carpathian
Macalester International Vol. 2
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Basin. Visitors from across the country and from abroad
expressed their admiration for the spectacular national exhibi-
tion in Budapest. The Times of London, the most influential
paper in the world at the time, praised the Kingdom of Hungary
in a leading article, stating that she “represents the success of the
liberal ideas . . . proving that by their aid [she] can march to
increased population and prosperity.” The high standard, pros-
perity, and mentality of fin-de-siècle Hungary are reflected faith-
fully today in the monumental neo-Gothic Parliament building
on the banks of the Danube in the center of Budapest. The
carved stones, murals, and statues, as well as the entire interior
reflect not only the centuries of struggle but perhaps also the
most fundamental characteristics of the Hungarian nation. For
here, at the meeting place of the Eastern and Western halves of
Europe and of the great linguistic families and religions, the
Hungarians have managed to blend the rich variety of Europe’s
traditions and values into their own unique synthesis.
Hungary’s ideal geographical position at the crossroads of the
traditional East–West and North–South trading routes, coupled
with its fine climatic conditions and natural endowments, has
made it a frequent target for attempts at conquest. Hungary has
had to struggle hard not just for national independence but for
her very existence. For 450 years, from the fall of the capital city
Buda to the Ottoman Empire in 1541 until the withdrawal of the
Soviet forces in 1991, foreign forces were stationed continuously
in the country, with the exception of a brief twenty-three-year
interlude beginning in 1921.
The twentieth century brought a particularly dire fate to the
Hungarian community. Compelled to take part in two world
wars—to a decisive extent against its own interests and will—it
suffered huge losses of life and, despite considerable mitigating
circumstances, ended up being punished with members of the
losing side. Hungary, one of Europe’s oldest kingdoms, ceased
to exist after the First World War. The peace treaty dictated by
the victorious powers took from Hungary not only the territo-
ries where the majority of the population was non-Hungarian,
but one-third of all ethnic Hungarians. More than three million
people, Hungarian in their language and self-identity, involun-
tarily became citizens of the newly established states of Czecho-
slovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania (which tripled in size).
Géza Jeszenszky
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In the four decades between 1918 and 1958, the country
became a theater of war three times, and each time the people
were ravaged by foreign troops. The army of Nazi Germany
occupied Hungary in March 1944 (to prevent its joining the
Allies) and, aided by Hungarian collaborators, sent more than
half a million Hungarian Jews to the death camps. The Soviet
Red Army, which ousted the Germans by spring of 1945,
imposed on the Hungarian people an irrational and criminal
system that damaged the country economically, politically, and
spiritually. Second only to the peoples of the former Soviet
Union itself, Hungarians may well have been those most
severely affected by communism, due to the exceptionally bru-
tal and servile henchmen of the regime. This, in part, explains
the force of the popular revolution that erupted in 1956. The
purity, discipline, and common sense of that revolution was
decisive evidence of the sobriety, maturity, and generosity of the
Hungarian people, and it elicited an outpouring of sympathy
around the world.
Hungary’s modern history has been seriously affected by
Europe’s assessment of it. Hungary was noticed mainly in con-
nection with particular historical dramas such as those of 1848 –
49, 1919 – 20, the Second World War, 1956, and, finally, the his-
toric changes of 1989. Western Europeans have often perceived
the Hungarians (and their fellow Central Europeans) as a free-
dom-loving people, unselfishly sacrificing for their own inde-
pendence as well as others’, receptive to efforts at self-correction
and improvement, and in the forefront in declaring religious tol-
eration. At the same time, however, there have been frequent
charges of nationalism, of intolerance toward the neighboring
peoples and those now residing with the Hungarians, of a deep
rift between the ruling elite and the common people, and of
entry into bad alliances. These conflicting assessments are not
simply the result of changing historical circumstances. They are
connected to the political conflicts and territorial disputes of
Central Europe and to the fact that the Hungarians shared a des-
tiny—and, on many occasions, conflict—with the Germans, Slo-
vaks, Romanians, Serbs, and Croatians. The peoples of Central
Europe often were the object of the rivalries of the neighboring
great powers.
Macalester International Vol. 2
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Hungary has been a country, rather magnanimous by tem-
perament, that welcomed settlers, refugees, knights, and mer-
chants during almost eleven centuries, allowing them privileges
through the kings and the landowning classes. Hungary had no
witch trials, pogroms, or ghettos. So long as the country was
able to control its own affairs, no group was expelled for its reli-
gion or ethnic origin. The Hungarian ethnic community, which
constituted approximately 80 percent of the population prior to
the onslaught of the Ottomans, made up less than 40 percent by
the end of the eighteenth century, a consequence of the constant
warfare and a kind of “ethnic cleansing.” However, the liberal
and tolerant climate of public opinion and law in the nineteenth
century, accompanied by a booming economy and a cultural
revival, led to a situation (not unlike that of the United States)
where, by the beginning of the twentieth century, the newly
immigrated Jews as well as the established Germans (and, to a
lesser extent, a narrow, upper layer of other non-Hungarian
peoples of the country) willingly became culturally and linguis-
tically Hungarians, always claiming to be proud Hungarian
patriots.
On the other hand, as a result of defeat in the wars of inde-
pendence, the Nazi and Communist dictatorships, and difficult
economic circumstances, hundreds of thousands of Hungarians
have fled their country. The Hungarian diaspora today numbers
well over a million (not including the nearly three-and-one-half
million Hungarians living in the states neighboring Hungary).
Hundreds of thousands of Hungarians live widely dispersed in
the United States, Canada, Australia, South Africa, and several
South American countries. Economic conditions, as well as the
advance of the Red Army and the communist takeovers, have
prompted millions of Poles and Ukrainians along with a consid-
erable number of Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Romanians, Estonians,
Latvians, and Lithuanians to emigrate to the Americas and Aus-
tralia. These “hunkies,” “Polacks,” and their fellow immigrants
were often ridiculed and abused. They intermarried first among
themselves and later with the natives, eventually becoming citi-
zens of the host countries. Today, they act as pressure groups on
the governments of their adopted countries.
For Hungarians, history has been a series of setbacks accom-
panied by ill luck and misjudgment in politics. The mood of the
Géza Jeszenszky
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nation is encapsulated in the ode that became the national
anthem: “In ill luck’s place that long has rent us, bring instead a
happy year!”
Along with setbacks, Hungary has also experienced revivals.
In the twentieth century, after suffering major humiliation, the
nation still had the strength to start anew in 1920, 1945, and
1956. These efforts brought considerable positive results, but
there was no opportunity for longer periods of consolidation
and fulfillment. Other Central Europeans also showed great
energy and ingenuity once they became independent nations,
but all too often, the periods of promise were abruptly ended by
war, conquest, and abandonment.
IV. The Change of 1989
The change of system brought about after the peaceful revolu-
tions of 1989 confronts Hungarians and other Central Europeans
with one of the hardest, yet potentially finest tasks in their his-
tory: control of their own destiny. Hungary has not enjoyed
such a favorable conjunction of political circumstances for five
hundred years. The present favorable moment, however, may
soon pass. Both the government and the people have a responsi-
bility to live up to the great opportunity of these times. The task
at hand is to renew the political, social, and economic system
and to render it capable of integration into the established eco-
nomic and political organization of Western Europe. This
requires not only the successful conduct of domestic and foreign
policy, but the patience and willingness on the part of the gen-
eral public to make sacrifices. The same patience, along with the
willingness to assist Hungary and her neighbors, is required of
successful democratic countries of the world. No people can
prosper today if left alone to their own devices.
V. The Legacy of Communism
In 1989, what Hugh Seton-Watson called the “Political Ice Age”
came to an end, but the meltdown continues to be fraught with
many dangers. The transition from a communist dictatorship to
a democracy and market economy is an uncharted journey. The
legacy of communism has turned out to be much more grave
Macalester International Vol. 2
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than anybody had imagined. Just as the wars of the Middle
Ages claimed many fewer casualties than did the epidemics that
followed, the dead body of communism is poisoning the air
over Eastern and Central Europe and continues to take a heavy
toll. In addition to redundant industries, inefficient manage-
ment, and terrible pollution (so terribly symbolized by Cher-
nobyl), the mental damage has been almost crippling.
The political and economic consequences of the communist
system are relatively well known, but the impact of forty-five
years of totalitarian dictatorship on the thinking of people who
grew up in it is far less noticed. After the suppression of the
Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the “Prague Spring” of 1968, and
the Solidarity movement in Poland in 1981, people in these
countries learned the art of survival and advancement: oppor-
tunistic behavior, silence, and care for only their own individ-
ual, short-term interests. Not having been taught the basics of
social and political behavior — or rather, having been condi-
tioned to condone any immoral conduct—they developed a per-
verted idea of right and wrong. This attitude paid off, and since
the 1970s, people in Hungary had modest economic safety with-
out real responsibilities. There was full employment in subsi-
dized industries, largely dependent upon cheap energy
imported from the Soviet Union. In return, Hungary provided
an undemanding but safe market for Soviet goods. All that was
possible only through accumulating an enormous external debt.
By the 1980s, the citizens of Hungary were living in a fool’s par-
adise. Poland was in much the same situation until 1980, when
the attempt to place the burden of external debt on the popula-
tion led to the birth of the Solidarity trade union movement.
Romania paid back its heavy debt, incurred by financing
Ceaus¸escu’s ludicrous projects, by the end of the 1980s at an enor-
mous sacrifice; but it cost the throne of the dictator. Bulgaria
went bankrupt while experiencing political changes, while the
rigidly orthodox Czechoslovakia kept clear of massive foreign
loans in order to keep foreign influence away.
Communism homogenized and “proletarianized” its society
by maintaining low standards and low aspirations. At the same
time, there developed in Central Europe, particularly in Hun-
gary, what sociologists call “a premature welfare state,” where
social benefits were relatively high, the retirement age was low
Géza Jeszenszky
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(fifty-five and sixty for women and men, respectively), medical
care was free (although of a very low quality unless the doctors
and nurses were given extra payment), and the prices of basic
food and medicine were kept artificially low. All of these factors
compensated for the low incomes and lack of freedom.
Meanwhile, the gap between Eastern Europe and the
advanced countries was rapidly widening. When the commu-
nist leaderships reached the end of the road and admitted some
of their past mistakes, such as the previously concealed debt, it
became obvious that they were running out of ideas. Everyone,
including the previously very loyal (i.e., handpicked and rela-
tively well-paid) journalists, began to speak of the need for
change, but few were aware of the costs.
VI. No Plan for Reconstruction
The average citizen of the former communist countries does not
understand what happened to the authoritarian world in which
he or she learned the harsh rules of survival. Of course, most
people were happy in 1990 with the disappearance of fear and
constraints, but they knew neither how to take advantage of a
free, competitive system nor what were the demands of the mar-
ket economy. As Aristotle said, “It is easier to be a slave than to
be a free man,” so under freedom, many people soon found it
hard to see the value of the changes and began to show some
longing for a world that was impossible to resurrect.
Western Europe and the United States were also unprepared
for these changes. This was first pointed out by the late Hungar-
ian Prime Minister József Antall, who warned at the Paris Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) summit
in November 1990 that perhaps the greatest danger for the new
Europe lay in the continued division of the continent with the
replacement of the Iron Curtain by a Welfare Wall that would
separate the victims of communism from their more fortunate
fellow Europeans. While NATO soldiers spent four decades
preparing for a war that was successfully averted, NATO politi-
cians created no contingency plan in the case of victory. During
both world wars, extensive preparations were made for postwar
reconstruction, yet none seems to have been made for the post-
Cold War period.
Macalester International Vol. 2
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VII. Achievements and Disillusion
Three years ago, after the failed coup in Moscow and the disso-
lution of the Soviet Union, everyone (except the communists of
Yugoslavia) thought that communism was dead and the com-
munists discredited. But today, while democratic constitutions
have been established in most of the former communist coun-
tries, the very communists (namely the younger echelon of the
apparatchiks) are back in office, only this time not because of the
brutal force of the Soviet Red Army, but because of a proper
electoral system and a press mainly in their hands. “How was
the East lost?” asked Adrian Karatnycki in the National Review,
attributing the blame to the Western leaders. “The Fall and Rise
of the Communists,” was the title of an eye-opening article by
Anne Applebaum in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs. Even in the
New York Times, A. M. Rosenthal wrote about the return of “the
ghost people.” How did it all come about?
Before offering an explanation of how the Poles and Hungari-
ans, who put up such a spectacular resistance to communism in
1956 and 1980–81, voted former communists into power in 1992
and 1994, respectively, it is important to reiterate some of the
historic achievements for which these two nations are largely
responsible. Victory in the Cold War, without a single shot fired,
was the outcome of the peaceful political transformation in
Poland and Hungary in 1989. That led to the fall of the other
communist dominoes: East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria,
Romania, Albania, and, finally, the Soviet Union itself. In the
wake of the free elections, Hungary, joined by Poland and
Czechoslovakia, brought about the dissolution of the Warsaw
Pact and later COMECON. Former enemies became new allies
as freedom was restored over vast territories in Central and
Eastern Europe. Closed markets opened for export and import,
creating new jobs in the United States and elsewhere. The
investment-friendly climate of Budapest, Warsaw, and Prague
enabled new businesses to start in those historic places, and
President Bush even proposed the conclusion of free trade
agreements between the U.S. and Central Europe.
Unfortunately, the newfound freedom was no compensation
for the hardships of the transition to a market economy. Igno-
rance about the prerequisites for a smoothly functioning, devel-
Géza Jeszenszky
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oped society gave rise to unrealistic expectations in 1990. Com-
munism, which was characterized by shortages, created a per-
verted consumerism and an incredible preoccupation with
material goods. When goods appeared in the previously empty
shop windows, many people were ready to do almost anything
to obtain them. It was not obvious to the average citizen of the
former communist countries how the high standard of living so
manifest in Western countries was attainable. People became
frustrated and despondent, and they quickly blamed their new
problems and disappointments on their new, democratically
elected leaders. To some extent, they also blamed their foreign
supporters, who failed to provide a new Marshall Plan and to
support the victory of our common European values.
The intellectuals who came to power in the newly liberated
communist countries relied on their political and moral convic-
tions and their experiences under the dictatorial regime. Havel
represented the intellectual approach of a moralizing writer, but
he was also able to capitalize on his well-earned popularity in
the international media. In Hungary, Prime Minister Antall and
his team of historians hoped that leaders of both East and West
would apply the lessons taught by history. Historia est magistra
vitae — History is the master of life — or, as Bolingbroke said,
“History is a philosophy which teaches through examples.”
However, during the last five years, the most obvious lessons of
the twentieth century have not been understood in either the
East or the West.
In the wake of inflation and mass unemployment, it was
inevitable that the governments and political forces directing the
first phase of the transition would lose popularity. The new,
democratic politicians, who had intellectual backgrounds but
little administrative experience, accepted the conversion of com-
munists into democrats and free-marketers. They faced a hostile
press that is, for the most part, still the mouthpiece of the old
communist regime and is now situated in newspapers pur-
chased by West European capitalists. The mistakes committed
by the new political elite were magnified by the skills of their
more experienced New-Leftist opponents.
The first noncommunist governments of Hungary, Poland,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Albania, and, to a lesser
degree, of Bulgaria and Romania achieved a great deal in four
Macalester International Vol. 2
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years by introducing many unpleasant but necessary measures
and laws. The following is a brief outline of the major measures
passed in Hungary.
• Regulation of property rights to allow for compensation to
victims of illegal “nationalization” and collectivization, as
well as for those who (or whose family) suffered from judicial
crimes such as execution, deportation, forced labor, imprison-
ment, or torture.
• Regulation of a market economy.
• Privatization. Today, more than 50 percent of the GNP comes
from private firms.
• Encouragement of foreign investments. In Hungary alone,
seven billion dollars arrived; this equals half of all invest-
ments in ex-communist countries.
• Foundation of a legal system based on European standards.
• Regulations to assist victims of the transition, e.g., unemploy-
ment benefits.
• Special benefits for the poorest in order to prevent depriva-
tion-increased crime, with special attention given to families
with children (in view of the very low fertility rate inherited
from communism).
• Maintenance of the value of pensions in times of relatively
high inflation.
• Provisions for expanding education, particularly at the uni-
versity level, where the country was falling behind most
European nations.
• Substantial investments in telecommunications and road con-
struction (including hundreds of miles of bike paths). This
was combined with privatization.
In foreign policy, Hungary took the lead in dismantling the
Warsaw Pact and COMECON and was the first to be admitted
into the Council of Europe, the community of democratic Euro-
pean states. Simultaneously with Poland and Czechoslovakia,
Hungary negotiated an agreement with the European Commu-
nity and submitted an application in April of 1995 for full mem-
bership in the European Union. Hungary was also building
solid political and economic relations with Russia and the
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Ukraine, and initiated the political and economic cooperation of
the Central European countries, named the Visegrad Three
(Four, after the split between the Czechs and Slovaks). Hungary
preserved peace while the brutal Southern Slav war was fought
along its southern border, inundating the country with refugees.
Last but not least, Hungary supported the cause of three and a
half million Hungarians in the neighboring states in their strug-
gle for survival.
Notwithstanding all the results, the majority of the ten and a
half million Hungarian citizens “proletarianized” during forty-
five years of communism resented that while the traditional
shortage of goods was over, affluence spread only to a small sec-
tion of the population. Under communism people learned that
life was a zero-sum game—one person’s gain was seen in direct
correlation with another person’s loss — and, so, they believed
that the arrival of the new rich meant that they would become
poorer.
Perhaps if Hungarians and the people of other formerly com-
munist countries had been better educated in the basics of
democracy, if they had more knowledge about how democracy
and the market economy function, if they had had a better
understanding of the hardships of the transition, and if the gov-
ernments had communicated better with the population, then
the people might have better appreciated their countries’
achievements. Only a massive educational campaign, assisted
and supported from outside, could have successfully completed
this eye-opening exercise. The energy and optimism of 1990 was
undermined by a negative campaign to denigrate all achieve-
ments, to discredit well-meaning governments, and to extirpate
all hope and idealism. A population whose only weapon under
the communist ideology was cynicism was unprotected against
the negative campaign.
VIII. The New Dangers and the Responsibility of the West
For centuries, Central and Eastern Europeans blamed their for-
eign masters—the Russians, the Turks, and the Hapsburgs—for
their misfortune. Today, the responsibility for good or bad deci-
sions lies within themselves. But their friends in the West also
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could have shown more understanding for the plight of the new
democracies.
The former “captive nations” found themselves akin to the
hero of The Spy Who Came in from the Cold, a man who was given
a hero’s welcome, but who, when the air around him began to
cool down, realized he had been out in the cold too long to fit
into the cozy world. Apart from the smell of poverty, the West-
ern countries became frightened by the deadly passions that
engulfed the Balkans. They found no recipe for containing
aggression, reconstructing the Eastern European economies, or
curing those societies’ ills.
Too many people expected immediate improvements in their
lives once communism had been defeated. Liberation from fear
and even the freedom to misbehave could not prevent disillu-
sionment from becoming the prevailing mood of the people.
Much of the faith they previously had in the West, in democ-
racy, and in the changes that began in 1989 has been lost. Many
have become passive, while others turn to extremists of both the
Left and Right. The success of aggressive forces in the Balkans
have induced many throughout the former Soviet Union to turn
to force. Intolerance toward communities whose language, cul-
ture, and traditions differ from the majority (such as the Tartars,
Chechens, and many others in Russia; Albanians, Hungarians,
and Croats in Yugoslavia) has grown to alarming proportions.
The one-time victims of Russian/Soviet imperialism feel
increasingly threatened, especially as many see Western
appeasement in policies toward Russia. Hunger, exasperation,
and the outbreak of long-forgotten epidemics throughout the
former Soviet Union could lead to a new version of imperialism.
The previously tightly controlled population has turned into a
high number of refugees in the Caucasus area, added to Bosnian
and Croatian refugees. This could become a serious situation,
not only for Central Europeans but for Western Europeans as
well. The principal question is how to transform the victory of
freedom and democracy into secure governments for the benefit
of the whole of Europe.
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IX. The Eastern Frontier and the Way Out
I believe the best way to achieve this security is for Western
institutions to open their ranks and expand eastward so that sta-
bility and prosperity can be established. It was not the Hungar-
ian people or their neighbors who did not accede to the
Washington Treaty of 1949 or the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Soviet
domination could not allow it. The peoples of the former Soviet
bloc have suffered greatly, and today they seek guarantees and
pledges that they will not be abandoned as they were after 1945,
and again in 1956, 1968, and 1981. The victims of the communist
utopia are not asking to join the European institutions in order
to present a common front against an enemy, but rather to work
jointly for the European utopia that is emerging today.
Nor does the expansion of stability and security eastward
pose a threat to Russia. On the contrary, a stable and prosperous
Central Europe would be advantageous for countries to the east,
as it would improve their chances for following suit quickly. It
would encourage the democratic forces of Russia and Ukraine
because Central Europe has long been seen by them as a testing
ground, a model within reach.
Of course, a great deal of work must be done by the former
communist countries themselves. But in order to put their
economies and social systems in order, they need stability, pro-
tection from outside threats, and membership in Western insti-
tutions. In 1994, NATO announced that it would be ready to
accept well-qualified new members. This decision, although
somewhat late, would contribute to the solution of many prob-
lems.
In 1996, the European Union will hold an intergovernmental
conference to decide on its future, including eastward expan-
sion. Both Hungary and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe
hope that by 1996, they will have surmounted the difficulties of
the transition from dictatorship to democracy and from an ill-
planned economy to a well-functioning market economy. This
hope may be over-ambitious. The positive results that began in
1989 are not likely to be unequivocally manifested by that date.
Today, there is a social and political system that assures life of
a higher quality than ever before in the history of mankind. That
system is attainable for what has traditionally been a very
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stormy zone in Europe. Democracy, human and minority rights,
stability, and prosperity are interdependent, and their eastward
spread can only occur gradually. This new eastern frontier zone
must one day pass through Central Europe and reach Kiev and
Moscow so that it can end up in Vladivostok and the western
coast of the Pacific. Then, the center of Europe will be able to
capitalize on its geographical position. This is also the precondi-
tion for dealing seriously with global problems such as back-
wardness in the East, poverty in the South, reckless pollution,
aggressive nationalism, and the threat of fundamentalist intoler-
ance. Only a Europe united with itself and in close alliance with
the United States can prove, as a Hungarian author once said,
that “reason and solidarity are mightier than the terror of pas-
sions.” It is only in this way that we can utilize the results of that
annus mirabilis so that the twenty-first century might be better
than the twentieth.
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